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The Case for the Treasury

What does a government count when it counts education?

Key Takeaways

  1. Governments judge whether education worked by the tax people pay years after leaving school.

  2. By the time that tax figure arrives, it is too late to help the student.

  3. Schools already collect early warning signs, like attendance and grades, but governments never ask for them.

A student’s readiness for work is first tested in a job interview, years after school. Their readiness for society shows up decades later, in how long they live, or whether they end up in the justice system. By the time either number arrives, it is far too late to do anything about it.

Here is what late costs. In May 2026 Alan Milburn’s review for the UK government put the cost of the country’s almost one million young people who are not in education, work or training at £125 billion, which it called “more than we spend on education each year”. Europe counts the same way. The EU’s own research agency put the cost of its young people outside work and study at €153 billion for 2011.

That is the bill for getting it wrong. To decide whether they are getting it right, governments use a sum. The OECD adds up the extra tax a person will pay over a working life for each level of education they complete, and subtracts what that education cost the state. On average across OECD countries, a man who finishes upper secondary school returns about $46,800 to the state, and a graduate about $127,000. For women the figures are far lower, which says less about their education than about what the sum is made of: tax on earnings, and nothing else.

The economists who build these figures know how narrow that is. The World Bank’s review of the research says an ideal calculation would count benefits that never turn into money, and that it leaves them out because there is too little evidence on them. Governments measure financial return because it is the one thing somebody collected.

There are good reasons for that. Tax records cost nothing extra to collect, they are hard to dispute, and they let a pound spent on schools be compared with a pound spent on hospitals.

That would matter less if the figures stayed in the OECD’s tables. In July 2025 the United States wrote a test of what graduates earn into law. Under the One Big Beautiful Bill Act, every degree course in the country will be judged by what its graduates earn four years after finishing, against working adults in the same state who finished at high school, and a course that fails in two years out of three loses access to federal student loans. The first courses can be cut off from 2028. Most will clear the bar. Among those projected to fail are two-year degrees that train early childhood teachers and master’s degrees in mental and social health services. Nobody in Washington decided that teaching small children or supporting people in a mental health crisis is worthless. They decided to count earnings, and earnings gave that answer.

So the state has a single measure of whether education worked, it has begun to act on it, and it arrives late. A graduate’s tax record says nothing useful until they have been working for several years, and a school leaver who never finds work appears only in the £125 billion. The Milburn review saw where the gap opens. “A school is recognised, regulated and rewarded for examination results,” it says, “not on where the student ends up.” The law asks schools to develop the whole person and they check exam results, because exam results are what they have.

Earlier signs exist, and schools already hold them. In Chicago, a ninth-grader’s attendance and course grades predicted whether they would finish school better than the test scores they arrived with. In North Carolina, a teacher’s effect on attendance, behaviour and grades predicted their students’ later completion better than the teacher’s effect on test scores. Almost none of this is reported upward, because nobody upward has asked for it.

Acting on those signs is harder than spotting them. In the one large American trial, schools using an early warning system cut chronic absence and course failure a little after a year, and a Norwegian trial found nothing.

Nobody can promise, then, that better data would pay for itself, and it should not have to. A fairer system that never showed up as a saving on a Treasury spreadsheet would still be worth having. But a Treasury that spends £122 billion a year on education, and learns whether it worked from tax returns a decade later, is in no position to say what pays for itself.

Better data in schools would tell the state whether any of this is working while the student is still in the room, which is the one time anyone can still do something about it, for the taxpayer and the student both.

Sources

  • OECD (2021), Education at a Glance 2021: OECD Indicators, Indicator A5, "What are the financial incentives to invest in education?", pp. 98–111, https://doi.org/10.1787/b35a14e5-en. Tertiary: "On average across the OECD, the public net financial returns for attaining tertiary education is about USD 127 000 for a man and USD 60 600 for a woman" (p. 102; Tables A5.3 and A5.4, 2018 data, USD converted using PPPs, 2% discount rate). Public costs are direct public spending plus foregone taxes; public benefits are the income tax and social contribution effects (p. 103 and Definitions, p. 107). Upper secondary: web-only Tables A5.9 and A5.10 of the same indicator (listed p. 108, StatLink https://stat.link/fjzscv), OECD average row, net financial returns column: USD 46,800 for a man and USD 14,600 for a woman; United Kingdom rows: USD 62,300 and USD 13,700. Checked against the tables on 3 Oct 2026. The OECD's 2024 editorial records that women with a tertiary qualification earn 17% less on average than men and have an employment rate six points lower.
  • George Psacharopoulos and Harry Anthony Patrinos, "Returns to investment in education: a decennial review of the global literature", Education Economics, vol. 26, no. 5 (2018), pp. 445–458, https://doi.org/10.1080/09645292.2018.1484426. Quotations from the Methods section, pp. 446–447. Open copy: https://datatopics.worldbank.org/education/files/GlobalAchievement/ReturnsInteractive.pdf
  • One Big Beautiful Bill Act (signed July 2025), earnings accountability ("do no harm") test for degree programmes. Explained in Caldwell, Matsudaira and McCann, "The One Big Beautiful Bill Act's New Accountability Standard", American University PEER Center, October 2025, https://www.american.edu/spa/peer/upload/obbba-accountability_rpt_final.pdf (test design, two-of-three-years rule, loss of Direct Loan access but not Pell Grants, undergraduate certificates exempt). Rollout, timing and projected failures: Camhi and Turner, "New 'do no harm' test targets low-earning college degrees", NPR, 30 June 2026, https://www.npr.org/2026/06/30/nx-s1-5835631/turner-camhi-do-no-harm-college-loans (first designations from the 2028–29 award year; early childhood educator associate degrees, mental and social health services master's, 14% of bachelor's music degrees including Juilliard and the New England Conservatory; Nicholas Kent quotation). Brookings, "How OBBBA reshapes student lending", January 2026, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/how-obbba-reshapes-student-lending/ (about 1.8% of students on failing courses).
  • Alan Milburn, "Young people and work: interim report", Department for Work and Pensions, 28 May 2026, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/young-people-and-work-interim-report. Quotations from the Foreword. The £125 billion is described there as a "cumulative annual cost"; its analytical annex (section 15) builds it from lost output (£38 billion direct, £63 billion lifetime scarring), tax foregone and benefit spend (£3.2 billion each direct, £15 billion scarring), NHS costs and a wellbeing estimate.
  • Eurofound (2012), NEETs: Young people not in employment, education or training: characteristics, costs and policy responses, Publications Office of the EU. Executive summary: "In 2011, the economic loss due to the disengagement of young people from the labour market was €153 billion. This is a conservative estimate and corresponds to 1.2% of European GDP." https://assets.eurofound.europa.eu/f/279033/9e48d8f2be/ef1254en.pdf
  • Elaine M. Allensworth and John Q. Easton, What Matters for Staying On-Track and Graduating in Chicago Public High Schools: A Close Look at Course Grades, Failures, and Attendance in the Freshman Year, Consortium on Chicago School Research, University of Chicago, July 2007. Ninth-grade attendance and course grades predicted graduation better than eighth-grade test scores.
  • C. Kirabo Jackson, "What Do Test Scores Miss? The Importance of Teacher Effects on Non-Test Score Outcomes", Journal of Political Economy, vol. 126, no. 5 (2018), pp. 2072–2107. Ninth-grade teachers in North Carolina; teacher effects on absences, suspensions, course grades and grade repetition predicted high school completion better than their effects on test scores.
  • Faria, Sorensen, Heppen and colleagues, Getting Students on Track for Graduation: Impacts of the Early Warning Intervention and Monitoring System after One Year (REL 2017–272), IES/REL Midwest, 2017. 73 high schools; chronic absence 10% against 14%, course failure 21% against 26%.
  • Sletten, Tøge and Malmberg-Heimonen, "Effects of an early warning system on student absence and completion in Norwegian upper secondary schools: a cluster-randomised study", Scandinavian Journal of Educational Research, vol. 67, no. 7 (2023), pp. 1151–1165. 42 schools; no significant effects on absence, completion or results after two school years.
  • Institute for Fiscal Studies, "Annual report on education spending in England: 2025–26", January 2026, https://ifs.org.uk/publications/annual-report-education-spending-england-2025-26 (UK public spending on education £122 billion in 2024–25, in 2025–26 prices).